Language and Visual Consciousness from the Enlightenment to Today by Karn Lawrence & Hattori Takahiko
Language and Visual Consciousness from the
Enlightenment to Today
著者 Karn Lawrence, Hattori Takahiko
journal or
publication title
Otsuma journal of social information studies
volume 26
page range 125-134
year 2017-12-30
URL http://id.nii.ac.jp/1114/00006579/
Creative Commons : 表示 - 非営利 - 改変禁止
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.ja
　1.　Introduction: the Visual Turn
This article explores ways visual tropes of the 
Enlightenment illustrate the concept of seeing the 
world through the eyes of others and presage 
contemporary visual notions such as transparency 
in politics and recognizing wider points of view. 
Scholars, such as Jean Le Rond D’Alembert, Francis 
Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Richard Rorty, Peter de 
Bolla and Gillian Beer have commented on aspects 
of this idea. Although what D’Alembert, Hutcheson, 
and Smith say about visuality may not refer directly 
to how their use of visual metaphors suggests we 
must adopt a wider point of view which engenders 
an internationalist perspective—one that necessarily 
includes the call to diminish inequalities suffered 
by disadvantaged groups—their explanations of 
visuality are seminal. 
We begin with D’Alembert’s metaphor of light as 
knowledge. Hutcheson discusses seeing as a matter 
of interpretation which involves looking for a 
different kind of reality, and equates due culture as 
cultivation of moral sense that is equivalent with 
learning to see correctly. Smith’s notion of the 
impartial spectator, Rorty’s pragmatic standard of 
sentimentalism for seeing others in a process of 
seeing the world through others’ eyes, de Bolla’s 
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work in “The Visibility of Visuality”, and Beer’s 
“‘Authentic Tidings of Invisible Things’: Vision and 
the Invisible in the Later Nineteenth Century” all 
serve to further illustrate that the most useful gifts 
from the Enlightenment are still being unwrapped. 
We suggest that focus on “the visual turn” continues 
to be a significant topic of study, insights into which 
promise to yield new contributions to the history of 
knowledge. 
　2.　 Reflections  and the Dawning of the 
Trope of Enlightenment and Vision
2.1　 Knowledge as Light and Self-knowledge 
as a Mirror
Jean Le Rond D’Alembert’s considerations and 
explanations of the significance of a number of 
Enlightenment thinkers in “Reflections on the 
Present State of the Republic of Letters” were 
impor tant in creating a sense of solidarity of 
E n l i g h t e n m e n t  t h o u g h t .  D ’ A l e m b e r t ’ s 
“Reflections” is in accord with Diderot in terms of 
the necessity of doubt (rather than faith) in gaining 
knowledge of nature. His praising discussion of 
Enlightenment philosophers—which include 
Descar tes and Bacon as well as Newton and 
Locke—reveals the interaction of science and 
metaphysics, noting that Locke accomplished in 
metaphysics what Newton had done in physics. 
D ’Alember t ’s  re f lect ions ,  cons ider ing h is 
commentar y on Newton’s system of  optics 
deconstructing light in order to better understand 
its true nature, can be useful in introducing the 
notion of visual consciousness because the 
metaphor of light as knowledge is a good starting 
po in t  in  a  d iscuss ion  o f  the  opt ics  o f  the 
Enlightenment.
A brief number of comments by D’Alembert 
demonstrate how he evoked the theme of vision as 
the central trope for how attitudes change when one 
is able to see the world through other’s eyes. He 
lauds the efforts of Enlightenment philosophers, 
saying that, “Without desiring to tear the blindfolds 
from the eyes of their contemporaries, they worked 
silently in the remote background to prepare the 
l i g h t  o f  r e a s o n  w h i c h  g r a d u a l l y  a n d  b y 
imperceptible degrees was to illuminate the world” 
(The Portable Enlightenment Reader, Kindle Edition, 
7-8). D’Alembert comments on how Francis Bacon 
“united everywhere the most sublime images with 
the most rigorous precision”, that Isaac Newton 
“made light known to mankind by decomposing it… 
[to create] …a completely new system of optics” (8) 
and that John Locke “after having contemplated 
himself for a long time, he merely of fered to 
mankind in  h is  Essay  Concer ning Human 
Understanding the mirror in which he had seen 
himself” (14). 
This articulation of self-reflection also presented 
an identity that the ideal enlightened individual both 
perceived and displayed. D’Alembert expresses this 
standard in a rhetorical manner, posing and 
answering a question, in the following extract. He 
poses the question. “Moral philosophers are fond of 
asking how men lived in what is called a state of 
pure nature, before there were organized societies 
and laws, and whether such a state was one of peace 
or war” (15) and examines some of the unsatisfying 
explanations before returning to the model he feels 
will satisfy the quest for a definition of idyllic natural 
harmony. “Yet there is, it seems to me, a shorter 
way to decide the question; that is, to examine the 
way in which men of  letters have behaved 
throughout the centuries” (15). Self-reference as 
the embodiment of enlightened individuals becomes 
the “auto-spectator” of the ideal of humanity.
2.2　 Moral Perception as a Way of Seeing 
Correctly
In Francis Hutcheson’s “Concerning the Moral 
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Sense”, he uses the phrases moral sense and 
moral perception interchangeably. We feel that 
Hutcheson’s practical argument is that the concept 
of moral perception forms the basis for all moral 
sense. Hutcheson’s central thesis in “Concerning 
the Moral Sense” is that the innate predisposition 
toward goodness must be cultivated and this act of 
cultivation enhances human dignity. He states this 
is not the “ordinary condition of mankind … [and 
is, instead,] … the condition our nature can be 
raised to by due culture” (Hutcheson, 279). This 
will prove useful in advancing the project of visual 
consciousness because Hutcheson is very much 
concerned with what we are able, willing and 
trained to look for and see. Among the possible 
topics to be explored in Hutcheson, though not 
limited to Hutcheson, are notions that: seeing is a 
matter of interpretation, involves looking for a 
dif ferent kind of reality, and the equation due 
culture as cultivation of moral sense equals learning 
to see correctly.
With specific reference to the trope of seeing, 
looking and vision, Hutcheson poses the rhetorical 
question,
must there be an higher power too to correct 
our reason? [He replies,] no; presenting more 
fully all the evidence on both sides, by serious 
attention, or the best exercise of the reasoning 
power, corrects the hasty judgment. Just so in 
the moral perceptions. This moral sense from 
its ver y nature appears to be designed for 
regulating and controlling all our powers. (277)
The visual turn, in terms of the presence of a 
spectator, is explicitly stated in Hutcheson’s 
comment that “in moral good, the greater the 
necessary sacrifice was which was made to it, the 
moral excellence increases the more, and is the 
more approved by the agent, more admired by 
spectators, and the more they are roused to 
imitation” (277). 　　　　　
Beyond these brief extracts, however, Hutcheson 
does not concern himself specifically with visual 
tropes. Rather, he uses the term “moral faculty 
[italicized by Hutcheson in the original]: as by such 
reasoning and reflection we may discover a perfect 
consistency of all the generous motions of the soul 
with private interest” (280).
2.3　 Impart ial  Spectatorship and Seeing 
Oneself through the Eyes of Another
We contend that  Adam Smith’s  pract ical 
argument is fundamental to the optics of the 
Enlightenment and seminal to the central role of 
the visual in shaping morality and in engendering 
attitude shift. In Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith 
presents the standard of the impartial spectator 
who one must imagine as oneself judging one’s own 
actions. The trope of oneself as independent 
observer of oneself—which Smith uses to explore 
cultivation of individual identity leading to social 
responsibility—speaks both to Newton’s act of 
taking light apart in order to see its components 
and to Bentham’s panopticon as an iteration of 
Smith’s impartial spectator. Further, in commenting 
on Peter de Bolla’s “The Visibility of Visuality” 
below, the relevance of imagination in creating 
Smith’s impartial spectator will be explored.
The importance of the visual in seeing the world 
through other’s eyes is introduced in an observation 
Smith presents before moving to the concept of an 
impartial spectator as moral arbiter of our actions. 
Smith writes, “Our first ideas of personal beauty and 
deformity are drawn from the shape and appearance 
of others, not from our own. We soon become 
sensible, however, that others exercise the same 
criticism upon us” (Smith, 282).
Extending the notion of aesthetic criticism to 
cases of legal turpitude, Smith presents the 
standard of the impar tial spectator who, as a 
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thought experiment (and greatly foreshadowing 
John Rawls’ individual in a state of reflective 
equilibrium), one must imagine as oneself judging 
one’s own actions. Smith presents the situation of 
an individual reflecting on a socially undesirable act 
in the following extract. 
When he looks back upon it and views it in the 
light in which the impartial spectator would 
view it […] He is abashed and confounded at 
the thought of it and necessarily feels a very 
high degree of that shame which he would be 
exposed to, if his actions should ever come to 
be generally known. (Smith, 282)
Finally, it must be noted that engaging with the 
world in a very real sense—such as through the 
study of world news and international events—can 
enhance the clarity with which we may view the 
world through others’ eyes far more than the most 
assiduous practice of impartial spectatorship. In 
support of this contention, Smith notes, 
the abstract  and ideal  spectator of  our 
sentiments and conduct, requires often to be 
awakened and put in mind of his duty, by the 
presence of the real spectator; and it is always 
from that spectator, from whom we can expect 
the least sympathy and indulgence, that we are 
likely to learn the most complete lesson of self-
command. (287)
3.　Modern Considerations and Limitations
3.1　 How Enlightenment Concepts of Seeing 
Create an Occluded Vision of Humanity 
Richard Rorty’s “Human Rights, Rationality, and 
Sentimentality” considers the effects of essentialist 
notions of humanness and suggests a more 
pragmatic way to view human rights. Rorty’s paper 
asks, how do modern day prejudices of race, 
religion, creed and tribalism and how could 
Enlightenment thinkers deny human-being status 
to any member of our species? He asserts that 
absolutist notions that confer an invisible moral 
right—the Enlightenment notion of rationality—
established a standard whereby those falling short 
of this definition were effectively dehumanized. He 
suggests what, in my formulation, amounts to a new 
standard for seeing others in a process of seeing 
the world through others’ eyes. Rorty refers to this 
action as “sentimentality” and describes how it 
operates through sharing of stories that touch our 
similarities. 
In “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality”, 
Rorty suggests the sorts of long sad stories that put 
us in another person’s position are the ways to 
invoke a more useful sense of the impar tial 
spectator. Rorty comments that the 
moral educator’s task is not to answer the 
rational egoist’s question ‘Why should I be 
moral?’ but rather to answer the much more 
frequently posed question ‘Why should I care 
about a stranger, a person who is no kin to me, 
a person whose habits I find disgusting?’ (185) 
Here Rorty reflects on the inadequacy of the 
abso lu t i s t  un iversa l i s t  not ions  o f  spec ies 
membership in humankind; these were arguments 
he has convincingly challenged in his critique of 
Enlightenment in his article, and Rorty now moves 
beyond them to present a better suggestion. He 
says,
A better sort of answer is the sort of long, sad, 
sentimental story that begins, ‘Because this is 
what it is like to be in her situation - to be far 
from home, among strangers,’ or ‘Because she 
might be your daughter-in-law,’ or ‘Because her 
mother would grieve for her.’ Such stories, 
repeated and varied over the centuries, have 
induced us, the rich, safe, powerful people, to 
tolerate and even to cherish powerless people 
– people whose appearance or habits or beliefs 
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at first seemed an insult to our own moral 
identity, our sense of the limits of permissible 
human variation. (185)
Addit ionally,  we advocate advancing this 
recommendation with reference to how, by thought 
experiment or actual [even if temporary] joining 
with others, one experiences the lived reality of the 
other. Rorty’s paper provides a useful critique of the 
l imitat ions in the “categorical  imperat ive/ 
absolutist-rationality” optic of the Enlightenment. In 
considering how stirring sentimentality by telling 
stories that evoke our common humanity connects 
with photographs as an element in seeing the world 
from the perspective of the other, a starting point 
might be in the obser vation that stories may 
thought  o f  as  p ic tur es  made  wi th  wor ds . 
Conversely, pictures/ photographs often tell stories 
people translate into their own words. If we are now 
mor e  eas i ly  “moved  to  ac t ion  by  sad  and 
sentimental stories” there is reason to feel the 
stories people imagine when they engage with a 
photograph will be similarly moving.
3.2　 Visuality from Hegel to Lacan via Adam 
Smith 
Visuality in modern concepts of the gaze owes 
much to the Enlightenment concept of  the 
spectator. In terms of historical chronology, Adam 
Smith antedates Hegel and Jacques Lacan is the 
most recent of these three luminaries to explore 
how the visual and the gaze are tied in with identity 
formation for the viewer as well as for the viewed. 
However, as a thematic progression that reworks 
Peter de Bolla’s discussion of modern visuality as a 
“line of sight between Hegel and Lacan via Sartre” 
(de Bolla, 65), we have placed Adam Smith in 
Sartre’s stead. We do this to accommodate later 
discussion of Smith in a manner that expands on de 
Bolla’s commentary. 
Peter de Bolla’s “The Visibility of Visuality” 
catalogues a number of strands in ways of seeing. 
He notes it is “common in the literature of visual 
theory to invoke the Enlightenment as some kind of 
ground upon which modern conceptions of the 
visual field are constructed” (65) and Lacan is 
mentioned as a type of heir to de Bolla’s formulation 
of the Enlightenment’s privileging of visuality as its 
guiding metaphor. Indeed, de Bolla’s article sets out 
to offer, “a specifically nuanced historical perspective 
on Enlightenment modes and modalities of visuality” 
(65).
Part of what de Bolla seeks to do in examining 
Lacan is similar to our interest in how seeing the 
word from the perspective of the other acts to 
diminish disadvantaging inequalities and engender 
movement toward an internationalist perspective. 
As de Bolla notes, “Lacan’s interest in the visual and 
the gaze more specifically is, of course, tied up with 
a much larger and more complex topic: the 
formation of the subject” (66). 
Discussion of the gaze provided by de Bolla 
traces a pattern from Sartre’s consideration of the 
objectifying gaze that disappears when it is noticed 
by the individual being looked at, to Lacan’s 
challenge of Satre’s analysis, to Adam Smith’s 
formulation of the gaze of the impartial spectator. 
We of fer our interpretat ion of  de Bolla ’s 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  m a n e u v e r  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g 
explanation. First, Sartre notes that it’s natural to 
see ever ything in the surrounding world as an 
object. When we look at other humans, however, 
the humans may look back. When they look back at 
us we recognize they are not merely objects and 
our power to see them as objects disappears. Lacan 
takes this situation one step further; Lacan asks 
what ef fect this reverse gaze has on us when we 
realize we’re being regarded by others. How does 
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what we think we are compare to what we think they 
think we are? How do we present our identity to 
match the way we hope others will see us? Lacan 
uses the term ego projection to describe the identity 
we want others to see as our identity. We next ask 
what effect this reverse gaze has on our behavior. 
Here, the moral philosophy of Adam Smith provides 
an answer. Smith advises us to imagine an impartial 
spectator watching over all our actions. Terms that 
are common today, like social conscience and social 
justice, may be reasonably traced back to Smith’s 
theory of moral sentiment.
de Bolla quotes Lacan’s interpretation of Sartre to 
present what amounts to the first half of the above 
paragraph. de Bolla goes on to quote Lacan (even if 
de Bolla neglects mentioning the concept of ego 
projection) explaining, “The gaze I encounter ... is 
not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the 
field of the other” (de Bolla, 66). Our analysis of 
Lacan on this point is that the imagined gaze is 
one’s own ego projection, which Lacan refers to as 
the small “a” (from the French autre) and which he 
contrasts to the large “O” of Other, which Lacan 
uses in capitalized form to refer to the master 
signifiers that we seek to identify with and please in 
a number of ways. In Lacanian philosophy the big 
“O” of “Other” refers to big concepts or entities (the 
master signifiers) like justice or beauty. The small 
“other” (that somehow isn’t translated from the 
French for other, autre, and keeps the confusing 
small “a” form) refers to lesser signifiers that 
support the master signifiers. In the examples just 
cited, law is one of the minor signifiers supporting 
the master signifier justice, prettiness or the latest 
fashion would be one of the minor signifiers of 
beauty.  These “ways” are the “registers of 
subjectivity” through which language and culture 
define our reality.
The commentar y by de Bolla, citing Lacan 
referencing Sartre is: “He [Lacan] writes, ‘In so far 
as I am under the gaze, Sartre writes, I no longer 
see the eye that looks at me and, if I see the eye, the 
gaze disappears.’ Lacan asks at this point, ‘Is this a 
correct phenomenological analysis?’ and he answers 
‘No. … The gaze sees itself. The gaze I encounter ... 
is not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the 
field of the other’” (66). 
While de Bolla’s detailed analysis of Lacan’s 
relationships between the spatial orientations of 
subject, gaze and look require de Bolla to present, 
analyze and explain a number of diagrams Lacan 
had created to illustrate these concepts, Adam 
Smith’s central image of oneself imagining looking 
at oneself is sufficient to consider at this point. In 
making the connection between Lacan and Smith, 
de Bolla opines that in “Adam Smith’s The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, we will encounter so strong a 
prefiguration of this analysis that questions of 
chronological priority will seem irresistible” (66-67). 
Serving as a carefully considered detailing of and 
rich ground for a divergent crop of considerations 
of Enlightenment notions of visuality and their 
legacy to take root, de Bolla surveys and sets out to
si tuate Smith’s  account  of  spectatoria l 
subjectivity within the visual culture of mid-
eighteenth-century Britain, … investigate the 
differences between, say, looking or surveying, 
watching or spectating, that are articulated in 
Enlightenment discussions of viewing practice, 
… point to the semantic differences that are 
delimited by these words in our lexicon [and] 
… to a fully ar ticulated and ar ticulatable 
grammar of forms that constitute visuality in 
and for the Enlightenment. (68) 
While there is much else to consider in de Bolla’s 
theoretical characterization of eighteenth-century 
culture and its engagement in the visual field, which 
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may be of broader interest to the consideration of 
attempts at seeing the word through other eyes as 
potentially attitude-shifting movements toward 
redressing disadvantaging inequities, we will 
maintain our focus on Adam Smith. In the context 
of how Smith’s “impartial spectator” engenders a 
social ethic, de Bolla says, 
This sympathetic imagination is not only 
focused on others who might lead lives more 
miserable than our own; in an extraordinary 
conceptual concatenation it is also focused 
upon the subject itself. So it is that the society 
of spectacle in which one sees others through 
the prism of sympathetic imagination is troped 
into a self-regarding spectator sport in the 
production of subjectivity itself. (74)
Similar to Rorty’s concept of sentimentality, the 
importance of the visual functioning (or of visualizing 
the sentiments of others in Rorty’s formulation) of 
sympathetic imagination results in an “imaginative 
leap we make when confronted with others, which 
makes us resonate sympathetically to the plight of 
other individuals. Such sympathetic reactions are 
primarily governed by what we see” (75). 
Lines of sight situate the omniscient viewer (or 
image-creator) in the same position from which the 
photographer inescapably views the world. On the 
strong sense of visuality, in directly seeing and in 
being able to function in a social environment, 
Adam Smith also discusses the need for a dialogic 
sense of regarding self and others. Smith writes of 
how an isolated individual might develop a sense of 
self in saying, “Bring him into society, and he is 
immediately provided with the mirror which he 
wanted before” (p. 281). This perspective—the 
seminal characterization of light and vision as 
knowledge in ef forts to share a reasonable and 
benevolent sense of the world as characterized in 
Adam Smith’s exemplary impartial spectator, of the 
influences of visuality in general and in the analysis 
of Adam Smith’s trope in particular—is as common 
as the notion of perspective itself.
Each of these points support our contention that 
the visual dimension may be both a trope and a 
method for realizing one must act in the world from 
a humanizing perspective. With increasing intensity, 
there is support for this contention in D’Alembert’s 
seminal characterization of light and vision as 
knowledge in efforts to share a more reasonable 
and benevolent sense of the world, in Hutcheson’s 
moral perception that is admired by spectators and 
gives energy to the “generous motions of the soul”, 
in Smith’s exemplary impartial spectator, in Rorty’s 
suggestion of sentimentality and in de Bolla’s broad 
compilation of the influences of visuality in general 
and in his analysis of Adam Smith’s trope in 
particular. 
We also want to discuss a counter point that 
asserts that the visual just doesn’t contain all we 
thought we saw in it.
3.3　 Invisibility as a Direct and Discourse-
framing Challenge to the Visual Turn 
As proof that our commonplace Western assumption 
of the visual as synonymous with l ight and 
knowledge was not always the dominant mode of 
thought, it is useful to examine the alternate notion. 
Namely, that the visual was not the most appropriate 
trope for Enlightenment thinking or for interpreting 
the world. Gillian Beer’s “‘Authentic Tidings of 
Invisible Things’: Vision and the Invisible in the 
Later Nineteenth Century” suggests challenges to 
the argument for the primacy of the visual.
Beer’s central thesis is that sound rather than 
light or vision was becoming the dominant trope in 
the later nineteenth century as more and more 
scientists realized the limitations of vision. Since 
light was newly understood as motion of energy, 
131Karn and Hattori：Language and Visual Consciousness from the Enlightenment to Today
like sound waves or heat, the notion of vision and 
the visual was felt to be unreliable. Vision was, in a 
quite new way, subordinate to the invisible. … The 
invisible thus became a si te of  debate and 
perturbation for later-nineteenth-century people. 
Tussles developed for the control of meaning 
relating to that which is invisible: tussles between 
scientists and spiritualists, materialists and 
Christians. … The eye itself, in Helmholtz’s work, 
proved to be an imperfect instrument incapable of 
s table  resolut ion.  … Far  from dominat ing 
explanation or experience in this new mind-set, 
sight must welter in a world strung through with 
energy that declares itself equally as heat, light, 
sound. (Beer, 85)
This is a fascinating counter-claim to the usual 
characterization of Enlightenment thinking as 
invoking a visual sensibility; this is the claim that 
invisibility—as wavelength vibrations that create 
heat, light, and sound—is a more scientifically 
accurate trope than visuality. Then again, invisibility 
gained its power only when visibility had attained 
such a privileged position.
Equally fascinating is the suggestion that 
invisibility is also active, efficient and productive. 
“The invisible, instead of being placidly held just 
beyond the scope of sight, was newly understood as 
an energetic system out of which fitfully emerges 
that which is visible” (85). As we consider, back and 
forth, the question of why Enlightenment thinking 
ultimately jettisoned the popular fascination with 
invisibility (although it’s fascinating to speculate on 
the divergence between social sciences and physical 
sciences as having its origins in the split between 
metaphors of visual versus invisible explanations of 
the universe), one or two more features of invisibility 
may be considered.    
For example, while the idea of the invisible as an 
energetic system that is responsible for all we see 
might seem to hold the promise of growth, its 
corollary—the loss of energy and eventual death—
presents a much less-cheerful image. Partly as 
explanation and partly as contextualization, the 
limitation of a non-visual sensibility was emerging.
We may ask why, around 1850, there came to be 
a disappointment in “the invisible” as a way of 
understanding oneself and others, as a means of 
coming to terms with one’s identity, and as a way of 
framing one’s understanding of the world (even if it 
was not a way of scientifically understanding the 
world). In a most disenchanting way,
The invisible might prove to be a controlling 
medium, not a place to be explored; a condition 
of our existence, not a new country to be 
colonized. Paradoxically, this realization 
dawned alongside the great advances in 
microscopes, telescopes, and optics in the mid-
nineteenth century. (88) 
In what sounds like an almost wistful reverie on 
the tension between what we crave and what we 
have, the characterization of the effect of invisible 
energy was one of  uncer tainty.  “Instead of 
disclosure or exposure—the hauling of the hidden 
into the light—all life becomes a medium, a 
discharge, or a pathway. The visible forms that 
energy takes are evanescent and contingent” (88). 
Here we find Beer’s portrayal of invisibility to be 
almost poetic and recall Pattiann Rogers’ ‘The 
Doxology of  Shadows’  as a study of  visual 
metaphors as, paradoxically, keys to understanding 
the power of what we can’t see.
One of the interesting effects of the yearning for 
a positive metric of progress other than the visual—
one that was hoped to be an equally emotionally 
satisfying trope—was manifested in the movement 
to regard sound as being a more reliable essence of 
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the universe than light. “Attempts were also 
persistently made to find an equivalence between 
the visible and the auditory” (91). 
The  po int  tha t  emerges  i s  tha t  even  an 
understanding of the scientific basis for visual 
experiences; even the search for new ways to 
describe the world—based on sound rather than 
vision, for example—could not replace the appeal 
and eventual ascendancy of the visual turn. Visuality 
won, but not without a fight. “With the entry of 
‘energetics’ and wave theory into general currency 
came the question of how to give authentic 
expression to permanently and profoundly unseen 
processes. Vision was certainly not granted any 
easy authority one hundred years ago” (91) and we 
are left with a question of why the visual seems to 
remain popular and to provide ever-widening appeal 
as a leading trope of enlightenment and symbol of 
the Enlightenment.
　4.　Conclusions
The following considerations may be offered in 
response to this query. As introduced above, the 
overburdening of the visual trope and confusion of 
metaphor with reality—similar to some workers in 
nuclear facilities imagining that dosimeter badges 
somehow act as radiation repulsion devices rather 
than simply measuring the radiation workers are 
being subjected to—speaks to a need for clarity in 
what a device measures. It does not diminish the 
lethality of the radiation or the suggestive power of 
an image (or the trope of light and visibility for the 
Enlightenment), whether scientifically problematic 
or not. 
Beer’s points on the increasing power of 
invisibility hold true in terms of the scientific work 
visuality was tasked with and found incapable of 
performing in the later nineteenth century, but in 
present-day circa 2017 circumstances there are 
different expectations. Visibility and identification 
are nuanced with social justice, cultural, economic 
and a variety of other sight lines along which their 
effects may be manifested. 
Finally, as has been partially alluded to earlier, 
the semantic reality of invisibility is that it is an 
oppositional term. By this we mean that invisibility 
derives its meaning in relation to its visible effects. 
The visible is always needed to provide a basis of 
comparison. In moviemaking and in photography, 
the term “relative perspective” is used to describe 
the relationship that gives elements a sense of 
proportion. Just as a ten-foot high truck wheel only 
impresses with its size when a human stands beside 
it, the visible image, even if only as a visible effect, 
is always needed to convey the meaning of the 
invisible.
Visuality—par ticularly in the sense that the 
language of metaphor rather than science has 
maintained the predominance of the visual as the 
means of explaining our world—continues to be a 
powerful attribute; visual consciousness, as an 
inheritance from the Enlightenment, still shapes 
and creates our perceptions and claims about what 
is true and what is not.
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
* This paper was written in the main by Lawrence 
Karn, with the very kind assistance and support of 
Takahiko Hattori.
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